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"[T]he individual's right to the protection of his own good name
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth
of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty. "'
I. INTRODUCTION ............................ ..... 508
II. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN DEFAMATION LAW.....510
A. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan............ .............. 511
B. Gertz and the Origins of the Access to Media Test.......... 512
III. THE ACCESS TO MEDIA TEST IN ACTION ................ 514
A. The Role of the Test in Categorizing Plaintifs................ 515
B. Departure from the Access to Media Test....................... 518
C. The Test as Imagined by the Gertz and Hutchinson
Courts ................................... 520
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDIA, SHIFTS IN THE MAINSTREAM
* J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, May 2011; B.A. in
Journalism, magna cum laude, The George Washington University, 2006. The Author
would like to thank Professor Fred Cate and the entire staff of the Federal Communications
Law Journal for their input and invaluable assistance in the completion of this Note. In
addition, the Author would like to thank Joe and Cinda O'Connor and Collin McCready for
their tireless patience and support.
1. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)) (internal quotation omitted).
507
HeinOnline  -- 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 507 2010-2011
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
CURRENT ..................................... 521
A. New Definitions, New Media ................... 521
B. "New" Media and the Impact on Defamation Law......... 523
V. ACCESS, ACCESS EVERYWHERE...................... ..... 525
A. Constant Contact Between Private Individuals............... 526
B. Gertz in the Age ofSocial Networking .... ......... 528
VI. CONCLUSION .................................... ...... 532
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of the actual malice requirement for public
figures in defamation cases,2 the test employed by courts to distinguish
those public figures from private individuals has frequently included an
inquiry as to the level of access to media the plaintiff enjoys. This
determination has been one part of a multifactor test used to establish
whether the plaintiff is in fact a public figure who then must prove actual
malice in order to be successful with a defamation claim. Once the plaintiff
is found to be a public figure by way of this test, the burden on the plaintiff
is significantly higher-making the likelihood of success much lower.
Because of the resulting difficulty for the public figure plaintiff, it is
important that the test in place appropriately measures the plaintiff's role
within the controversy and in the public eye.
The definition of what comprises the media has changed in recent
years-blogs are no longer at the periphery of the media world, but have
found a place within mainstream media as a source and as a tool. The line
has further blurred with more widely accessible and user-friendly services
that allow users to share with an Internet audience at large; with the advent
of such social networking tools as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, it has
grown easier for anyone and everyone to access the media in one way or
another. With the current media landscape such as it is-political
candidates announcing their plans to run for office via Twitter and
Facebook,3 widely followed print columnists employing blogs in their daily
research, corporate America using YouTube videos to reach a wider
advertising audience 4-it is time to reconsider what exactly "access to
media" means. Without such a reconsideration, the access to media factor
in the public figure test in defamation law is outdated; furthermore, without
appropriate reconsideration in the context of technological advances, this
2. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
3. Russell Lissau, Candidates Like This. Following Obama's Lead, Hopefuls Embrace
the Internet, Cm. DAILY HERALD, Jan. 2, 2010, at 1.
4. See, e.g., Gatorade Mission Control, YouTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-InrOvEE2v38 (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (highlighting
the corporation's use of social networking to better access its marketing audience).
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test may lead to inaccurate conclusions as to who is a public figure, based
on judicial confusion as to what access means.
This Note will present the history of the public-private distinction,
beginning in Part II with the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, where the Court announced the test applicable for public
officials in defamation law-requiring a heightened burden to prove a
defamation case when a public official alleges defamation. This case began
a series of decisions by the Court in which the test was further refined, and
the class of people who were required to meet the "actual malice" standard
of proof was both clarified and expanded-by the time the Court decided
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., those who must prove actual malice included
public figures. With Gertz, the Court attempted to set forth explicitly the
appropriate test for determining whether or not a person alleging
defamation is in fact a public figure and must therefore prove actual malice.
Because of the added-and not insignificant-burden placed on plaintiffs
who are found to be public figures, the Court established a test by which
public figures may be proven as such. This required showing that first, she
has either achieved pervasive fame or notoriety because of his position in
society,s or that because of her role in the controversy at issue in the story,
she is a public figure for purposes of coverage pertaining to that
controversy. For the latter aspect of the test, the Court required either a
showing that she had voluntarily thrust herself into the issue and taken on a
position at its forefront, or that she had been involuntarily drawn into that
issue.
As one aspect of this determination, the Court instructed that an
inquiry as to whether or not the plaintiff had access to the media to
adequately redress the claims made against her should be employed.! For
this prong of the test, the Court concluded that an individual of prominence
would have ways to access the media and therefore to address the public. It
left the test at that, without delving into the adequacy required of that
response, nor the mode or medium of access that would satisfy the
requirement.
This Note will then go on in Part III to give an overview of how that
access test has been applied by lower courts, and the results lower courts
have come up with when grappling with what exactly access to media
means. There is not a clear consensus across all jurisdictions as to the
importance of this prong of the test, nor as to what exactly is required to
find that access to media is present in a particular context. Indeed, it does
not even seem clear what constitutes "media" for the purpose of showing
5. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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media access by the plaintiff.. This struggle has continued, and in recent
years, has run up against the technological developments and trends in the
area of online media and user-generated content. Part IV of this Note will
provide an overview of the changing nature of the media landscape, noting
the striking increase in the number and variety of ways that individuals can
access larger audiences through the Internet-and the very fact that such
networking has become ubiquitous (indeed, almost expected) in today's
society. The effect of such universal access and networking should not go
unnoticed by courts when they are considering an individual who is
claiming defamation, but such access does not necessarily equate to the
level of access imagined by Gertz when the Court established that the
ability to redress defamation claims is a factor to be considered.
This Note will then argue in Part V that the access to media test is no
longer applicable as it currently stands in this age of widespread access to
media, and as such may no longer appropriately serve as a safeguard for
private plaintiffs as it was initially envisioned by the Gertz Court. In order
to do what the Court initially intended of it, the access to media test must
take into account what the definition of "media" actually means today, and
it then must be adequately tailored to reflect the trend of social networking
and many-to-many online communication.8 It is not enough to accept the
ability to access some form of media-instead, the test must be
appropriately limited in order to find only those who have the ability to
access a similarly situated audience through a similar means of
communication as having adequate means of redress through the media.
II. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN DEFAMATION LAW
Prior to 1964, defamation law was exclusively governed by state law,9
but that changed with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'o The case came
before the Supreme Court in a time of political change, and with it came a
sea of change for the legal world, as well; the Court's decision was "one of
the most famous and important cases in all of constitutional
jurisprudence."" With this decision, the Court gave a constitutional
backbone to the law of defamation-recognizing the First Amendment
importance of core political speech and the need to provide publishers with
"breathing space" for such speech to occur.12 In subsequent cases, the
8. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
9. Erik Walker, Defamation Law: Public Figures-Who Are They?, 45 BAYLOR L.
REV. 955, 956 (1993).
10. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964).
11. MARc A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON & LYRISSA BARNETr LIDSKY, MASS
MEDIA LAw 271 (7th ed. 2005).
12. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 272 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))
(internal quotation omitted).
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Court broadened the scope of the rules set forth in New York Times to
occupy the area of defamation law by issuing a series of constitutional
decisions," each decision building upon the last.
A. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
The case with the most significant impact on defamation law began in
the arena of the civil rights movement. It stemmed from a full-page
editorial advertisement that ran in the New York Timesl4 that included
statements about police and official action against civil rights
demonstrators that had taken place in Montgomery, Alabama.' 5
The ad contained some apparently false statements regarding the
events that had occurred in Montgomery.16 A claim was brought by the
Commissioner of Public Affairs in Montgomery, L.B. Sullivan, who
alleged that the advertisement concerned him because of his role in
supervising the Montgomery Police Department.' 7 Sullivan claimed that
the charges asserted by the advertisement were leveled at him simply
because of the nature of his duties'8 and that he had therefore been libeled
by the advertisement.' 9 The trial court agreed, finding the advertisement
libel per se,2 0 a ruling that was upheld by the Supreme Court of Alabama.2 1
In a unanimous decision to reverse the ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts was
"constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom
of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of
his official conduct."22 In addition, continued the Court, a public official
must prove that the publication acted with "actual malice," that is, "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
13. Thomas Kane, Malice, Lies, and Videotape: Revisiting New York Times v. Sullivan
in the Modern Age of Political Campaigns, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 755, 762 (1999).
14. N. Y Times, 376 U.S. at 254.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 258-59 (including other falsehoods such as that the song the ad indicated was
sung by the demonstrators was mistaken; that the reasons for the expulsion of some of the
students were mischaracterized; that the campus dining hall was never padlocked; that
students had protested by boycotting classes rather than refusing to register for classes; that
the police never surrounded the campus, though they were deployed on three occasions; and
that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had only been arrested four times rather than seven).
17. Id. at 256.
18. Id. at 258 ("Respondent and six other Montgomery residents testified that they read
some or all of the statements as referring to him in his capacity as Commissioner.").
Sullivan was never actually referred to by name in the advertisement itself. See id
19. Id. at 256.
20. Id. at 262.
21. Id. at 263.
22. Id. at 264.
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false or not."23
This holding by the Court marked the first time that the First
Amendment played a role in defamation law; the Court upheld these
protections as necessary to give freedom of expression the "breathing
space" it requires.24 This was a recognition by the Court of the potential for
a "chilling" effect if such core political speech was not protected. 25 For the
first time, the bright line that protected plaintiffs from untrue speech was
blurred-the actual malice test ultimately protected those speakers who
acted without legitimate awareness of the falsity of their speech when
speaking about public officials. The aim was to allow discourse concerning
public officials as it advanced the introduction of important ideas into the
marketplace.
Following this decision, a series of cases fell into line before the
Court. Over the next decade, one case after another was decided that
expanded upon or clarified the Court's decision in New York Times. Most
significantly for purposes of this Note, the Court expanded the class of
individuals who were subjected to the actual malice requirement to include
not just public officials, but also public figures.26
B. Gertz and the Origins of the Access to Media Test
In 1973, a case came before the Court regarding a Chicago attorney,
Elmer Gertz, who was representing the family of a youth who had been
shot by a Chicago policeman. His defamation case resulted from an
editorial in American Opinion2 7 that accused Gertz of being a "Communist-
fronter"2 and of being a member of an organization that had planned a
Communist attack on the Chicago police.2 9 However, the issue in this case
23. Id. at 280.
24. Id. at 271-72.
25. Kane, supra note 13, at 771.
26. This extension was officially made in the companion cases Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967), but the test for determining
how a plaintiff should achieve the status of public figure was set forth in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
27. American Opinion is a publication of the John Birch Society. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
325. At the time, the publication was reporting on a supposed Communist conspiracy
against law enforcement. Id. For more information about the John Birch Society, see About
the John Birch Society, JOHN BIRCH Soc'v, http://www.jbs.org/about (last visited Feb. 23,
2011).
28. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326.
29. Id. (noting that the organization was the National Lawyers Guild, of which the
plaintiff was in fact a member, but that there was no evidence that he or the organization had
taken any part in planning the demonstrations during the 1968 Democratic Convention, as
asserted by the article). Significantly, in light of the actual malice standard, the Court noted
that the editor of American Opinion had made no effort to verify the charges against Gertz,
despite an editorial introduction to the article that claimed extensive research had been
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that was the focus of much of the Court's discussion30 was that of Gertz's
presence in the public realm--or lack thereof
Two years earlier, the Court decided Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
in which it concluded that the New York Times standard applied in such
cases that concerned matters of public or general concern'-a holding that
would certainly lend itself to application in this case because of the
publicity surrounding the youth's death in thicago. However, the plurality
decision in Rosenbloom left no clear guidance for the application of the
New York Times standard, so the Court in Gertz had to revisit the decision
in order to place its holding in the "proper context."3 2 In doing so, the Court
determined that Rosenbloom extended the application of the New York
Times standard to a degree that the Court found "unacceptable," leaving
otherwise private plaintiffs without an adequate legal remedy for
defamatory falsehoods injurious to their reputations.34 Under the precedent
set by Rosenbloom, any time a private plaintiff found himself involved in a
story of interest to the public, he would be required to prove New York
Times actual malice. With Gertz, the Court took a step back from this broad
view of the standard for the sake of protecting the truly private plaintiff.
The Court recognized that a story garnering media attention does not
necessarily make every individual involved in that story a public figure
without more. Had it left the test as it was, any person mentioned in any
story in the media would automatically meet the Rosenbloom standard and
be required to show actual malice. This was a burden the Court was not
willing to force upon all individuals without requiring a more searching
inquiry into their actual role in the issue, and whether they were capable of
responding to any allegations leveled at them.
With such concerns in mind, the Court held that the standard for
determining whether a plaintiff is in fact a public figure should require
looking to the reach of the plaintiffs prominence. On the one hand, courts
must consider whether he has achieved "pervasive fame or notoriety . . . for
all purposes and in all contexts,"3  making him a general-purpose public
figure. On the other hand, a court must consider whether it is dealing with a
plaintiff who has voluntarily injected himself into, or has been drawn
involuntarily into, a public controversy such that he "becomes a public
conducted. Id. at 327.
30. The Court also discussed at length the appropriate level of proof necessary for
plaintiffs depending upon whether they are classified as public or private figures. Id. at 342-
48. However, this aspect of the Court's holding is not relevant to the discussion here.
31. 403 U.S. 29,44(1971).
32. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 333.
33. Id. at 346.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 351.
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figure for a limited range of issues" 3 6 -the limited-purpose public figure.
In describing how a plaintiff might voluntarily inject himself into an issue,
the Court stated that he must "thrust himself into the vortex of [the] public
issue, [or] engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its
outcome."08 A key aspect to the Court's reasoning was the fact that public
figures, like the public officials discussed in New York Times, also tend to
have more effective opportunities to redress such defamatory statements by
maintaining regular access to the media."
This final point-the self-help available to public figures-has
remained a factor in subsequent defamation cases without adequate
consideration of its context at the time of the Gertz decision and its
changing context in light of today's media landscape. The Court addressed
the issue quite simply in Gertz, stating merely: "Public officials and public
figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of
effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy."40
The Court treated the notion of access with little explanation, because
at the time there existed only one definition of what media could mean, so
invariably the media world in which the plaintiff was defamed would be
similar to, if not the same as, the type in which that plaintiff could attempt
to respond. The Court made no reference to whether there was a
differentiation necessary when the defamation appeared in national media
versus local media, but it seemed to accept that media, generally speaking,
meant the print and broadcast media of the day. Thus it was in those media
that defamation could be expected to originate, and it was in those same
media that the plaintiff should seek to rebut such defamation.
III. THE ACCESS TO MEDIA TEST IN ACTION
Since Gertz, the access to media element of the public figure test has
been used frequently by the Supreme Court, as well as by lower courts
36. Id.
37. It is clearly much more common for an individual to rise to the level of public
figure in the context of one particular controversy. Consider, for instance, Bernard Madoff,
who was little known outside Wall Street prior to his arrest and conviction for "the biggest
financial swindle in history." Robert Frank & Amir Efrati, 'Evil' Madoff Gets 150 Years in
Epic Fraud, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at Al. For a person to achieve pervasive fame or
notoriety, it is generally understood that his name must be universally (or at least widely)
recognizable. Examples might include the late Michael Jackson or Oprah Winfrey, figures
who are not linked to one particular achievement or controversy but who are recognizable in
all contexts.
38. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
39. Id. at 344; see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2.05 (1st ed. 1986).
40. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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(though not with complete consistency41 ), to separate the categories of
defamation plaintiffs. The Court has continued to justify and explain the
element,42 and lower courts have continued to rely on it, frequently citing to
Gertz for the basis of the test.4 3
A. The Role of the Test in Categorizing Plaintiffs
Members of the Court have seen private individuals' inability to
access the media as a vulnerability, one that justifies protection of the
private individual by not requiring her to prove actual malice under New
York Times." In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, the Court provided further
elucidation of the rule, and found that it is not sufficient merely to show
that the plaintiff is able to respond to the defamatory statements and have
such responses published in order to establish that he has access to media.4 5
Instead, the plaintiff must have what the Court describes as "regular and
continuing access to the media," as such is "one of the accouterments of
having become a public figure."" In addition, in order for such access to be
sufficient for the purposes of the Gertz test, it must command enough
media attention to effectively rebut the defamatory statementS47 (despite the
Court's concession in Gertz that rebuttal "seldom suffices to undo harm of
defamatory falsehood"").
However, it is not clear to what extent the plaintiff must have the
ability to rebut defamatory statements. In Hutchinson, the Supreme Court
attempted to provide more guidance as to this factor,4 9 and in doing so, it
created ambiguity as to the threshold for sufficiency when it comes to
rebuttal or media access. This decision by the Court obscured the notion of
what type of access is necessary, giving weight to the ability to access the
media on a regular basis, rather than simply for the purpose of rebuttal in
41. See discussion of Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) infra pp. 13-15.
42. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 15 (1990); Phila.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774 (1986); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111, 136 (1979).
43. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1984);
Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir. 1981); Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693 F. Supp. 2d
442, 501 (E.D. Penn. 2010); Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1090 (D. Haw. 2007); Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 673 (N.D. 111. 1989); Reader's
Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610, 615 (Cal. 1984); Stolz v. KSFM 102 FM, 35
Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 743 (Ct. App. 1994); Ellerbee v. Mills, 422 S.E.2d 539, 540 (Ga. 1992).
43. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136.
46. Id
47. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 171 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
48. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974).
49. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136.
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response to media attention in the alleged defamation.so For lower courts,
this has resulted in a trend of paying "lip service to the media access
requirement,"5 ' but without a clear consensus on what its weight should be,
nor on what "access to media" means.52 As one federal court put it, the
resulting analysis for courts in determining who is a public figure has
become "much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall."
An example of a lower court's struggle with the access to media
factor was demonstrated by the Fourth Circuit in Hatfill v. New York Times
Co.5 4 In this case, the access to media factor was used as one of several
factors that were determinative of the plaintiffs status as a limited-purpose
public figure.55 Hatfill, a well-regarded scientist in his field of study, was
accused by a columnist in the New York Times of sending letters containing
anthrax to members of Congress and news organizations. The court
considered his renown in the field of bioterrorism and biological weapons,
and therefore his ability to gain attention from media and the public in that
arena, as sufficient for showing that he had continuing access to the
media.57 Instead of focusing on whether he could access the same types of
media that had published the allegedly defamatory statements, the court
focused on his ongoing relationship with scientific journals and experts in
the field as proving sufficient access to channels of communication.s
Hatfill cited the Fourth Circuit's decisions in Reuber v. Food
Chemical News, Inc.59 and Fitzgerald v. Penthouse International.60 In
Fitzgerald, the court announced a five-factor test for determining whether
the plaintiff is a public figure. 6 ' The first factor asked whether "the plaintiff
had access to channels of effective communication." 62 When the court in
1990 again was faced with a defamation claim in Reuber by a plaintiff who
purported to be a limited-purpose public figure, the court applied this same
Fitzgerald test and focused on the plaintiffs activity within his field of
expertise, including lectures he had given and reports he had published.6 3 In
50. Id.
50. Walker, supra note 9, at 976.
51. Id.; see, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir. 1984).
53. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), af'd, 580
F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
54. 532 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2008).
55. Id. at 318-19.
56. Id. at 314, 320-21.
57. Id. at 322.
58. Id. at 320-21.
59. 925 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1991).
60. 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982).
61. Id. at 668.
62. Id.
63. Reuber, 925 F.2d at 708.
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this instance, it was within this scientific arena that Reuber's reputation had
come under fire, and based on that fact, the court found that looking at
these channels and his access therein was the appropriate inquiry in
considering where that reputation could be redeemed.64 "The inquiry into
access to channels of communication proceeds on the assumption that
public controversy can be aired without the need for litigation and that
rebuttal of offending speech is preferable to recourse to the courts."65
The court in Reuber unnecessarily went on to note that it was
significant that the plaintiff there had not attempted to rebut the statements
through those channels to which he had access. However, Gertz did not
ever clearly state that an attempt at rebuttal is necessary, but rather the
appropriate inquiry is only whether the individual had the opportunity to do
so based on his status. And so in Hatfill, the Fourth Circuit correctly
stepped back toward the Gertz conclusion and away from the analysis that
the Reuber court had engaged in. The Hatill court determined that it is not
required that rebuttal be attempted, merely that the plaintiffs capability to
do so be considered in weighing the individual's potential access to
media.67
But in Hatill, the court also seemed to disregard the importance of its
position in Reuber that the channels of communication that are considered
"effective" for the purposes of response are those same channels in which
the reputation of the plaintiff was first at issue.8 When the Hatfill court
relied on this precedent, it mistakenly relied upon the attention Reuber had
garnered within the same arena in which he was defamed-the court
treated this as a signal that a visible reputation within a scientific
community was sufficient to show access to channels of effective
communication.6 9 The error the Hatfil court committed when drawing its
comparison to Reuber was its disregard for the fact that Reuber, unlike
Hatfill, was alleging defamation in the same arena in which he had gained
public recognition; in contrast to Reuber, Hatfill was alleging defamation in
the New York Times-clearly not a scientific journal or science-specific
publication. And while the court engaged in a discussion of the various
times he had been interviewed by or mentioned in similar such media
64. Id.
65. Id. at 708-09 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974)).
66. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
67. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 532 F.3d 312, 317-18, 322 (4th Cir. 2008).
68. Reuber, 925 F.2d at 708-09.
69. Hatfill, 532 F.3d at 322 ("In Reuber, we found that the plaintiff had testified before
Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency; had given lectures on subjects related
to the allegedly defamatory articles in which he was mentioned; had provided interviews to
a newspaper; and had published several relevant scientific papers. If Reuber's access to
channels of communication was sufficient, so too is Dr. Hatfill's." (citation omitted)).
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outlets, the court did not make it clear that it was on the basis of his ability
to access those outlets that his access to media was considered sufficient.70
Indeed, it is not clear from the court's analysis whether it would have been
merely sufficient for the purposes of the access to media test to show that
Hatfill enjoyed renown in the field of bioterrorism, or whether it was the
fact that he had also had been interviewed for both newspapers and
television reports that satisfied the requirement.7
It is that latter level of effectiveness that would seem to be the one
considered and set forth by Gertz, since the Gertz Court was aiming at the
notion of rebuttal-the ability to mitigate harm done by the purportedly
defamatory statement by accessing the same or a substantially similar
audience.72 Merely showing that a plaintiff enjoys some access to some
form of media is not sufficient; in Hatfill, it must have been his access to
the same or substantially similar outlets to the one in which the defamatory
material appeared that proved he had the appropriate level of access to
media to satisfy that prong of the limited-purpose public figure test.
B. Departure from the Access to Media Test
Other lower courts have not given this media access factor the same
weight as the courts in the decisions discussed above; and some have found
that it is not necessarily an integral part of the test in determining whether
the individual is a public figure-despite references to Gertz and use of its
language in stating the rule to be applied.
For instance, in Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., the
district court set forth a three-part rule for determining whether the plaintiff
is a limited-purpose public figure. First, there must be a public controversy
70. See id. at 321-22.
71. If it is the latter that the court intended to point to, then this would seem to satisfy
the Gertz test as the court originally imagined it. That is, if it was because he was quoted in
an article in the Washington Post and featured in a news broadcast on ABC News, as well as
the variety of different media outlets that ran stories featuring comments by Hatfill in the
days following the initial allegation, then this would seem to show that he had access to
effective channels of communication that are in the same vein as the media outlet that
initially published the allegedly defamatory statement (the New York Times). However, it is
the court's reliance on Reuber that blurs its conclusion because of the different categories of
media involved in the two cases. In Reuber it was only necessary to show that the plaintiff
had access to scientific journals and similar such outlets; in Hatfill, the plaintiffs access
must go significantly beyond the scientific community. Therefore, stating "If Reuber's
access to channels of communication was sufficient, so too is Dr. Hatfill's," Hatfill, 532
F.3d at 322, seems to underestimate the level of access necessary for Hatfill to satisfy the
Gertz test.
72. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (emphasizing the ability of
plaintiffs to "counteract false statements" when considering what "effective
communication" means).
73. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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or a dispute that has received media attention because of its potential
impact.74 Second, the plaintiffs role in the controversy must be analyzed
by considering whether he or she has in fact, as set forth in Gertz, "thrust"
himself or herself into the public controversy.75 Finally, the Waldbaum
court considered the defamatory statement and its relationship to the
76plaintiff's role in the controversy.
The court in Waldbaum makes no mention of access to effective
channels of communication in order to respond to the defamatory
statements, and, similar to Waldbaum, many courts have relied on such
tests that do not use the access to media factor.77 In fact, one such court
makes a note of the lesser importance of the access to media factor of the
test, even when it is used by courts, before proceeding to decline to use the
test itself: "Almost anyone who finds himself in the middle of a
controversy will likely have enough access to the press to rebut any
allegedly libelous statements, thus satisfying the Supreme Court's first
concern. It is perhaps because of this that the Court has regarded the second
justification as more important., 78
And so lower courts continue to regard the limited-purpose public
figure test with some confusion, and without a consistent voice. These
courts have attempted to use the guidance offered by the Supreme Court by
way of Gertz and Hutchinson, but have not managed to reach a consensus
on the importance of the access to media prong of the test.79 While it is
clear that the Court regarded the role of the plaintiff in the controversy
itself as an important determination for a court to make when assessing the
classification of the plaintiff, his access to media was certainly an aspect
the Court considered essential in Gertz and Hutchinson. It is just the exact
nature of this access that was not clearly defined.
74. Id. at 1296.
75. Id. at 1297; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
76. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1298.
77. See, e.g., Parsi v. Daioleslam, 595 F. Supp. 2d 99, 105 (D.D.C. 2009); Framsted v.
Mun. Ambulance Serv., 347 F. Supp. 2d 638, 662 (W.D. Wis. 2004); Howard v. Antilla,
No. 97-543-M, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19772, at *3-4 (D.N.H. Nov. 17, 1999).
78. Clyburn v. News World Comms., Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 32 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
79. From lower courts' downplaying of what "access to media" actually means in the
defamation context, it often appears that the heart of the overall test to determine whether a
plaintiff is public or private is in fact the role the individual played in the controversy-
whether he had voluntarily injected himself in it or thrust himself to the forefront. This is in
keeping with the discussion in Gertz that emphasized that the heart of the issue was not the
relative ease with which the public individual can access the media, but the very fact that he
brought publicity upon himself in the first place. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 345. Eliminating
the access to media test, however, ignores the Court's added concern about plaintiffs ability
to respond to the allegations, and therefore to effectively redress the claims made against
him. See id. at 344.
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C. The Test as Imagined by the Gertz and Hutchinson Courts
In considering Gertz and Hutchinson together, the Court's aim with
the access to media element of the test seems to be weighing the plaintiffs
ability to command media attention in order to redress claims leveled
against him.80 This would seem to resemble something more like the Fourth
Circuit's description in Reuber of the capability to access "the fora where
[the plaintiffs] reputation was presumably tarnished and where it could be
redeemed." 8' It was the Supreme Court's goal to consider when a plaintiff
would be able to effectively limit the damage done to him by defamatory
statements in the media, and lower courts that recognize the importance of
that aspect of defining a public figure have continued to use that element of
the test.82
The difference between a public figure and a private individual
changes the nature of what the plaintiff must prove in a defamation case,
and a public figure-more capable of accessing the media and therefore of
clearing his name-has a more difficult burden of proof. So it is the private
figure that the Gertz and Hutchinson courts were considering; it is the
private figure-who is unable to effectively stave off the negative
comments made against him by responding with his own comments-that
the Court was interested in protecting. Thus the Court's concern was
allowing those private individuals to prove their case and receive their
remedy through the courts.
However, the actual use of the test as applied by the lower courts83
often looks primarily at the first factor in the limited-purpose public figure
test-that of the plaintiffs role in the controversy-and less so at the
plaintiffs ability to respond effectively to defamatory statements that
appear in the media. Doing so, in fact, may seem logical in today's world
of twenty-four-hour news cycles and fully integrated media outlets; the
media are not only more accessible for the private individual, but in fact are
at his fingertips.8 But this is not necessarily the most protective approach
for private individuals. This media world, with so many eyes on so many
80. Id. at 345; Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 136 (1979).
81. Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708 (4th Cir. 1991).
82. See, e.g., Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 531, 534 (4th Cir. 1999); Douglass v.
Hustler Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128, 1141 (7th Cir. 1985); Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc.,
528 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1093 (D. Haw. 2007).
83. See Mark D. Walton, The Public Figure Doctrine: A Reexamination of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. in Light ofLower Federal Court Public Figure Formulations, 16 N. ILL.
U. L. REv. 141, 166 nn.134-35 (1995).
84. See, e.g., Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A
New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAUF. L. REv. 833, 836 (2006) ("The public
figure doctrine fails to account for access to means of corrective speech so prevalent on the
[Internet. But ironically, the ability to respond to defamatory speech served as a central
consideration in the creation of the public figure test.").
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different sources, still does not allow for just anyone to have the kind of
access that the Gertz Court had imagined was possessed solely of public
figures. And it is true that not all courts have moved away from the access
to media test altogether. Therefore, the access to media test remains a
potentially confusing and damaging tool for the courts to wield in
separating public figures from private individuals. In order to effectively
make this distinction, the Gertz vision of the access to media prong must be
revived to give it a new meaning and new life.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDIA, SHIFTS IN THE MAINSTREAM
CURRENT
At the time that Gertz was decided, the media consisted solely of print
and broadcast outlets. This media makeup was taken for granted by the
Court in its almost dismissive reference to the greater access enjoyed by
public officials and public figures.s While it remains true that public
officials and public figures are in the best position to gamer the attention of
large media outlets with minimal effort, this model fails to account for the
massive changes that have taken place-and are still taking place-in the
media world, and how those changes may impact the limited-purpose
public figure.
A. New Definitions, New Media
In recent years, the communication world has undergone a "dramatic
democratization"86 and the media landscape has shifted greatly. With the
advent of the blogosphere, followed closely by the rise of Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter, Internet media are no longer irrelevant or obscure.
Just a few short years ago, blogs were considered to be on the
periphery of the media world, something less than real journalism. In 2006,
blogs were referred to by one columnist as "the bustling, energetic Wild
West of the new Internet media." 87 Even though, at that time, blogs had
proven their significance by forcing Dan Rather's hand in revealing the
truth about President George Bush's military record after he reported on
President Bush's National Guard service based on what turned out to be
forged documents, blogs were still on the verge of being taken seriously.
However, bloggers no longer go relatively unnoticed. If there are
rumors circulating in the blogosphere, they will often be responded to in
85. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
86. Perzanowski, supra note 84, at 833.
87. Ellen Goodman, Bloggers Owe Carroll an Apology, Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 7, 2006, at
A17.
88. See Tim Goodman, Apology from CBS on Bush Memos, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21,
2004, at Al.
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the media. An example from the McCain-Palin campaign demonstrates this
phenomenon. Despite the absence of any "mainstream" press coverage of
Palin's sixteen-year-old daughter's pregnancy, a press release was issued
by McCain's campaign addressing the pregnancy to dispel rumors that had
been cropping up on blogs.89 Now "prominent journalists, many of whom
are bloggers themselves, promote blogs-or at least certain blogs, such as
those run by mainstream media outlets-as legitimate media outlets." 90
Blogs have become normal features on news outlets' websites,91 and in
fact, it is commonly a marketing or corporate tool, without which
professional competitors might see an organization as an outcast.
In addition to blogs, Facebook and Twitter have recently taken on a
legitimate role in the world of online media. More and more organizations
are using Facebook and Twitter for their massive reach and their
communication and marketing potential. Congressmen are taking tutorials
on how to use Facebook to further relationships with constituents, 93 and
there have been announcements of political candidacy on Twitter that are
then reported in the print media.94
With so much integrated use of online services, it is clear that these
tools are coming closer to the center of the media stage. However, it is not
clear that courts are in tune with these changes, nor is it clear that they are
prepared to accept the possibility that an otherwise private individual may
have the capacity to reach thousands through her Facebook page, tweets, or
blog, without necessarily assuming a place in the realm of public figures.
89. Michael D. Shear & Karl Vick, No Surprises from Palin, McCain Team Says,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2008, at Al 7 ("McCain advisers said that after talking to Palin, they
decided to issue the statement about Bristol's pregnancy in the wake of repeated inquiries
from reporters after liberal blogs raised questions . . . .").
90. Anthony Ciolli, Bloggers as Public Figures, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255, 257 (2006).
91. See, e.g., CNNPolitical Ticker, CNN.com, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011); Blog Directory, NYTIMES.COM,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/topnews/blog-index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
92. Etan Horowitz, Film Recalls Blogging's Simpler Times, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug.
9, 2009, at GI; see also Rob Johnson, Running the Show-Screen Shots: Product
Placements Aren't Just for Big Companies Anymore, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2009, at R9
(explaining the potential for product placement and advertising on Facebook, Twitter, and
blogs).
93. Ian Shapira, Lawmakers Find a Friend in the Power of Facebook, WASH. POST,
Dec. 30, 2009, at C01 (discussing a lesson given by a Facebook representative to
Republican congressman, Rep. Peter Roskam of Illinois, who was learning about the ways
to use Facebook to provide more personal and timely information to his constituents, and to
help his constituents feel more connected to him).
94. See, e.g., Tom Infield, Gerlach Declares GOP Run for Governor, PHILA. INQUIRER,
July 15, 2009, at 101.
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B. "New" Media and the Impact on Defamation Law
The Supreme Court's basic assumptions as to media in the time of
New York Times and Gertz reflect the nature of media in that time-"a
simplistic and antiquated conception""9 that hardly compares to how the
media world looks today. The contexts in which blogs come up in
courtrooms often involve reporters' privileges (that is, whether privileges
that are granted to journalists should be extended to bloggers, as well96 ) and
whether or not anonymous bloggers can be forced to reveal themselves
when they have made defamatory statements.
Courts are certainly not entirely unaware of the existence of this form
of media, be it blogs or Facebook or MySpace.98 Instances of abuse or
harassment stemming from interactions on Facebook and MySpace are not
infrequent;99 child pornography and other cybercrimes force courts to look
95. Perzanowski, supra note 84, at 833.
96. See, e.g., In re Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring).
[I]f we extend that privilege to the easily created blog . . . have we defeated
legitimate investigative ends of grand juries in cases like the leak of intelligence
involved in the present investigation? . . . [D]oes the privilege also protect the
proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical "blogger" sitting in his pajamas at his
personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his best product to inform
whoever happens to browse his way? If not, why not?
Id. at 979, 981 (Sentelle, J., concurring); see also Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d
123, 140 (D.D.C. 2005) ("The proliferation of communications media in the modem world
makes it impossible to construct a reasonable or useful definition of who would be a
'reporter' eligible to claim protection from a newly minted common law privilege."). There
is little exploration by courts as to whether bloggers are journalists, or something different
entirely. See BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, No. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78481, at
*16 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007) ("[T]here is no published case deciding whether a biogger is a
journalist.").
97. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92 (2010) (finding that First Amendment
rights can be asserted by those posting on a blog, thereby leaving their anonymity intact);
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (setting forth the test that must be
met in order to compel the discovery of an anonymous Internet user in defamation cases);
Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a subpoena to reveal
an Internet poster's identity should have been quashed).
98. See, e.g., Salter v. State, 906 N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (acknowledging
that Facebook and MySpace increase the risk of child pornography images appearing on the
Internet); In re Forgione, 908 A.2d 593, 603 n.1 1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (acknowledging
that students could access one another's personal information via "an Internet program or
service known as 'The Facebook').
99. See, e.g., United States v. Beckett, No. 09-10579, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4989
(11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2010) (dealing with an appeal from a conviction for child pomography
charges that arose from the defendant's falsely created MySpace accounts, which were used
to persuade minors to send nude photos over the Internet); United States v. McCloud, 590
F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2009) (dealing with an appeal from a conviction for producing child
pornography and in which the court described the defendant's interactions with victims over
MySpace); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (describing interactions
over MySpace through a fake profile set up by defendant, including the resulting suicide of
the target of the MySpace interactions); United States v. Infante, No. 10-6144M, 2010 U.S.
Number 2] 523
HeinOnline  -- 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 523 2010-2011
FEDERAL COMMUNICA TIONS LAW JOURNAL
to the Internet and develop at least a cursory understanding of its contents.
Even jury instructions appropriately address the Internet services that might
allow jurors to communicate with others.'00 However, it does not seem that
courts are yet comfortable with defining the role that the Internet will play
in defamation law as a component of the media-not just as courts grapple
with how to appropriately address anonymous bloggers who are liable for
defamation, but also how this arm of the media should be treated in
considering the defamed individual's options for redress.
Media are rarely specifically defined in the defamation context, giving
little guidance for what should be included in a court's assessment of just
what media qualify for the access to media test.10' Without taking that extra
step to establish the types of media at play, courts are missing a major point of
the Gertz test: the Gertz Court imagined this prong as a means of redress-
redress cannot happen unless an audience that is the same or substantially
similar can be accessed and exposed to such a rebuttal.
Dist. LEXIS 30730 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2010) (describing the defendant's stalking of the
victim, which included contact via Facebook).
100. See, e.g., In re MAI-CIVIL, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 544, at *5-6 (Mo. Nov. 23, 2009)
(including an instruction admonishing jurors that they are not to "use a cell phone, record,
photograph, video, e-mail, blog, tweet, text, or post anything about this trial . . . to the
Internet, 'facebook', 'myspace', 'twitter', or any other personal or public web site . . . .");
People v. Jamison, 899 N.Y.S. 2d 62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (instructing jury not to use
Google Earth or to text or chat online about the case, in addition to instructing them not to
communicate on social websites such as Facebook, MySpace, or Twitter).
101. Thomas D. Brooks, Note, Catching Jellyfish in the Internet: The Public-Figure
Doctrine and Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 461, 478 (1995) ("The Court has never offered anything near a working definition of
'the media.' Rather, its approach is reminiscent of that employed by Justice Stewart when
faced with the task of defining pornography: the justices know it when they see it.") (citing
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also, e.g.,
Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Haw. 2007); Fiacco v. Sigma
Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 484 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Me. 2007) (summarizing that the position
held by the plaintiff involved access to media, mentioning only articles published in a
campus newspaper); Chafoulias v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 654 (Minn. 2003)
(concluding that, despite the fact that the initial defamatory story aired on a national ABC
program, the plaintiffs ability to appear in a two-part story on a local NBC affiliate was
sufficient to show he had "broad media access, allowing him to strategically place media
appearances . . . ."). In Chapman, which concerned a plaintiff who was a surfer, the court
summed up his media access:
[Tihe sheer volume of published materials quoting or referencing Plaintiff indicate
that the surfing media was, and continues to be, interested in him . . . . Although
the record on this matter is thin, it appears to the court that if Plaintiff wanted to
rebut [the] article-whether through an interview, profile, or opinion piece-the
surfing media would be receptive.
Chapman, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. This is not atypical of a court's treatment of this prong
of the test, wherein the court ignores any mention of the type of media in which those
"interview, profile, or opinion" pieces might run. After acknowledging the necessity of
assessing access, courts do not specifically explain what media would have satisfied the
prong, nor the types of media involved in the instant case that do satisfy the prong.
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V. ACCESS, ACCESS EVERYWHERE
In the current media environment, anyone with a computer can
become a publisher, and while many bloggers remain in obscurity, bloggers
and those well connected on social networking sites can successfully gain
media attention. 102 When that occurs, a blogger who was otherwise a
private individual may open herself up to the possibility of defamatory
statements.
In order to appropriately protect the private blogger from the
heightened standard of actual malice that she would be required to prove as
a limited-purpose public figure, it is necessary to give weight to the other
prongs of the test-that is, whether there is an isolated controversy,
whether the plaintiff has voluntarily thrust herself into the controversy, and
so on-before jumping straight to the access to media prong. In the absence
of such an approach, courts will necessarily lapse back to the reasoning of
the Court in Rosenbloom-one that was found to be unacceptable by the
Gertz Court' 03-by weighing only the element of public interest in the
controversy at hand and allowing that to uniformly create limited-purpose
public figures.
Once the other factors of the test have been appropriately weighed,
courts can turn to the access to media prong to differentiate plaintiffs who
may not automatically seem to be a central figure in the controversy from
those who clearly have thrust themselves into the controversy and have
taken the lead in determining its outcome.1'" It is with this prong that courts
102. See, e.g., Kyra Kyles, Bravo to Ordinary Twitter Celebrity, REDEYE (Aug. 6, 2010,
8:18 AM), http://www.chicagonow.com/blogs/kyles-files/2010/08/column-fodder-bravo-to-
ordinary-twitter-celebrity.html. The blog discusses Twitter user Steven Holmes, a UK
citizen who became the first person rapper Kanye West began following shortly after West
started using Twitter. Holmes rejected the attention the celebrity's following incited,
tweeting-presumably after the interviews he granted to local British media-"I won't be
speaking to anybody else; surprisingly not everyone wants to be famous .... That's all I'm
saying-peace out x." Id. The RedEye column noted Holmes' ability to "recognize, and
rebuff, the ridiculous fame seemingly bestowed on anybody these days, from a baby singing
'Single Ladies' to a grown man squealing like a sow over double rainbows." Id.; see also
Sarah Lyall, A Tweet Read Across Britain Unleashes a Cascade of Vitriol on a User, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, at A8 (discussing a "tweet" made by a user called "brumplum" that
launched a frenzied debate and called attention to the user, an otherwise unknown resident
of Birmingham, England); Maureen Ryan, An Unlikely New Source of Writing Talent:
Blogs, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 8, 2003, at Cl (discussing bloggers who had garnered wide
following and readership, and their subsequent hiring potential); P.J. Huffstutter & Jerry
Hirsch, Blogging Moms Wooed by Firms, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2009, at Al (discussing a
trend of food companies calling upon "mommy bloggers" to review their products).
103. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
104. If this is the case, an individual will often be both attracting and creating media
coverage through the very nature of her involvement in the controversy. This is when the
access to media prong can appropriately be downplayed, since when evaluated, it will be
found to be satisfied.
Number 2] 525
HeinOnline  -- 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 525 2010-2011
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
can gauge the individual's ability both to seek redress through the media
and to access an audience through which the defamation can be rebutted.
A. Constant Contact Between Private Individuals
Communicating constantly through social networking and other
Internet service providers has become so much a regular and routine
practice of private individuals that there is not an assumption of receiving
widespread attention from those communications. 0 5 In this age of social
networking, virtually everyone who is active on the Internet has become a
publisher to some extent'o0 -this means there are millions of potential
news outlets to be accessed everyday, with far fewer eyes on any individual
outlet. However, even though "[m]illions of teenagers use MySpace,
Facebook, and YouTube to display their interests and talents, . . . the
posting of that information hardly makes them celebrities."' 0
Without an emphasis on the voluntariness and involvement in the
controversy, it could be argued that anyone who can publish online should
be considered a limited-purpose public figure.' 08 Inaccurate assumptions
about accessing online audiences may lead to widening the scope of
limited-purpose public figures, as it may be taken for granted that
communicating to audiences online does not necessarily equate to seeking
105. Cf Ciolli, supra note 90, at 257 (arguing that a blogger must expect to receive
attention when she puts her thoughts about a controversy on a publicly accessible website
because of widespread readership of blogs). But see Lyall, supra note 102 (noting that the
user "brumplum" stated on his blog that his seemingly casual and "mildly critical" tweet
about British actor Stephen Fry had resulted in an unexpected surge of Twitter followership
and media attention, thus demonstrating the unexpected attention that a private individual
can spur without doing more than typing a quick tweet); Nottingham 'Tweeter' Gets
Followed Online by Kanye West, NoTTiNGHAM EVENING POST (U.K.), Aug. 6, 2010, at 3
(noting that the Twitter user whom Kanye West began following did not think the publicity
of having a celebrity following him, a move which resulted in the user gaining 6,000
followers on the social networking site despite his otherwise relative obscurity on Twitter,
was "worth it,").
106. See Perzanowski, supra note 84, at 835.
107. D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 428 (Ct. App. 2010). This is contrary to what
was once thought about the ability to respond on the Internet; when first the possibility of
posting immediately on message boards became an option, some thought that this would
mean that anyone capable of creating such a posting could adequately respond. Thus, by the
same argument, anyone who could access the Internet was a public figure. For this
argument, see generally Mike Godwin, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 4 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTs. L. REv. 1 (1994); Michael Hadley, Note, The Gertz Doctrine and Internet
Defamation, 84 VA. L. REv. 477 (1998). However, it has become clear more recently that
the Internet is more often a place for private individuals to network broadly than for private
individuals to take on a public persona by virtue of their networking.
108. See David Gordon, Taking the First Amendment on the Road: A Rationale for
Broad Protection for Freedom of Expression on the Information Superhighway, 3
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 135, 142 (1995).
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"both influence and attention."'09 While certainly a person posting on the
news feedsno of his 800 Facebook friends may be well-known within that
group, that is hardly grounds to require him to prove New York Times
actual malice the moment he is defamed; this is even more evident on
Twitter, where a relatively unknown individual can drum up followers
numbering in the thousands, many of whom may not even know the user's
real name. 1 This becomes a dangerous gray area when defamation is at
issue, because the plaintiff who cannot successfully show he is a private
figure will be required to show actual malice-a burden that the Supreme
Court never imagined would extend to truly private individuals.
Early views of the Internet did not take into account the possibility of
this user-generated world that is the Web of today.112 As one attorney noted
in 1995, "[the Internet publisher] has greater access (than private figures) to
the mass media and, thus, needs less libel protection, because he can rebut
claims against him . . . . Through global, instantaneous communication,
everybody has the ability to rebut everybody.""' It is true that the
individual has means on the Internet to widely access other individuals, and
now almost any individual can be such an "Internet publisher"; but the
assumption that "[t]he mere act of creating a blog draws public attention to
the author and his or her views" 1 4 does not hold true in an era of such
proliferation of user-generated content. The existence of so many sources
of information reduces the number of eyes on any one source; so despite
posting information on the Internet, an Internet user does not necessarily
guarantee herself access to an audience of any significant proportion.
Therefore, without properly balancing the generalization that Internet users
can adequately rebut statements made about them against the other
considerations of the limited-purpose public figure test, and without
tailoring the test to reflect the nature of the media involved both in the
defamation and in the potential for response, it is not clear how widely such
a classification might reach.
As such, it is necessary for courts to approach this new version of
access to media with caution. Simply concluding that "[b]y creating a blog,
109. Ciolli, supra note 90, at 271.
110. Facebook publishes a "News Feed" on the home page of all users, documenting the
status messages and activity of the user's friends.
S11l. This is made clear by the plight of "brumplum," the Twitter user who had the
misfortune of offending a popular actor, and therefore who now has over 1,200 followers.
Lyall, supra note 102.
112. See, e.g., Godwin, supra note 107, at 5.
113. Gordon, supra note 108, at 142 (alteration in original) (quoting David L.
Marburger, a lawyer for a defendant in an Internet libel suit) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
114. Ciolli, supra note 90, at 272.
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especially a blog that enables comments or [W]eb syndication feeds,
individuals seek both attention and influence in public debate, and thus
fulfill one of the elements of a limited purpose public figure,""' the
limited-purpose public figure test will know no bounds on the Internet.
Private individuals who are actively involved on the Internet will be
crossing liability lines unawares--or worse, if such a trend were to actually
gain legal steam,"'6 individuals might be deterred from sharing or
networking broadly online. This could put a damper on user-generated
content on the Internet, a tool that has become ubiquitous in today's
culture, and which is continually changing to reflect the new ways it can be
used to connect individuals more widely on an international scale." 7 If
individuals no longer feel that they are free to connect and share with one
another without exposing themselves to the risk of becoming public figures
in defamation claims, this modern version of the marketplace of ideas
could be chilled.
B. Gertz in the Age of Social Networking
When the Court was deciding Gertz, it did so with a singular
115. Id.
116. Id. at 269 (noting that as of the date of that publication, no blogger had sued another
individual or entity for defamation, but such lawsuits are inevitable).
117. Social networking sites have contributed to coordinating political activism on a
grand scale in recent years. This was especially apparent amid the January 2011 uprisings in
Tunisia and Egypt, the organization of which was largely credited to Facebook by a number
of media outlets. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, Facebook and Arab Dignity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/opinion/25iht-
edcohen25.html?_r-1 &scp=l&sq-facebook%20and%20arab%20dignity/o20cohen&st-cse
(In discussing the successful Arab uprising that overthrew the government of Tunisia
without an identifiable leader, Cohen notes, "Or rather, its leader was far away: Mark
Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook. Its vehicle was the youth of Tunisia, able to use
Facebook for instant communication and so cyber-inspire their parents. . . . Facebook
propelled insurrection from the interior to the Tunisian capital in 28 days."); Griff Witte,
Egyptian Opposition Calls for Massive Protest; Foreigners Flee, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2011,
at Al (noting that while Facebook was initially an organizational tool, Internet access
became scarce after several days of protests). Similarly, in Iran in 2009, protesters used
Twitter to draw international attention to violence against protesters as the protests were
happening. See David Zurawik, Iran Protests Present a Revelation, Challenges in
Newsgathering, BALT. SUN, June 28, 2009, at IE; Nazila Fathi, Iran's Opposition Seeks
More Help in Cyberwar with Government, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at A6; see also The
Rage of Followers, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2010, at G2 (questioning whether sites such as
Twitter and YouTube allow for more power to challenge leaders-or at least for more
global recognition of repressive leadership-in light of protests in Kyrgyzstan); Michael
Wines, Sharon LaFraniere & Jonathan Ansfield, China's Censors Tackle and Trip over the
Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at Al (describing a particular blogger who maintains six
different blogs in order to try to outwit Chinese censors who attempt to block certain types
of political speech on the Internet and noting how this particular blogger sees other Chinese
Internet users growing incensed against the restrictions on their Internet speech and
attempting to push the wall back).
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understanding of the media landscape as it existed in 1974.' At that time,
the media were entirely limited to print and broadcast media, often
represented by large conglomerate news organizations.1 19 The notion of the
citizen journalist (a term that has been given to bloggers and other such
individuals who take on the role of journalist, generally without affiliations
with any news outlet2 ) or even the Internet were not so much as blips on
the Court's radar screen. But the Court based its decision to include "access
to media" as an element in establishing a plaintiff as a public figure for a
particular reason, that of protecting the "good name" of the private
individual.12' That reasoning still has meaning today, despite the great
shifts in the media landscape.
Today, more than thirty years after Gertz, millions of people get their
news from the Internetl22-whether from a blog or from a news
organization's website, the Internet has become a widespread resource for
accessing real and current news. As a realistic component of what
comprises media in this era, this needs to be factored in to courts'
considerations. When the Gertz Court spoke about accessing the media and
the ease by which public figures were able to do so, it was addressing in
simple terms what was a simple truth: those with a firm grasp on the
public's attention through their position as public officials or widely known
figures would have the opportunity to garner the press's attention to rebut
statements made against them. The Court, seemingly without feeling the
need to elaborate, accepted that it was these people who needed less
protection from the courts because they had more opportunity to remedy
118. See Perzanowski, supra note 84, at 833.
119. See Marc A. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation
Litigation, 5 Am. B. FouND. RES. J. 455, 465 (1980) (defining the context for defamation
cases and listing media defendants as those "engaging in newspaper, magazine, or book
publishing or in broadcasting"); Max M. Kampelman, Congress, the Media, and the
President, 32 PROC. ACAD. POL. Sci. 85, 90 (1975) ("There were in 1975 fewer than forty-
five cities with two or more competing dailies and about 1,500 cities with a noncompetitive
daily press. And each year more and more of these noncompetitive dailies are purchased by
the big corporate chains.").
120. See, e.g., Mark Glaser, Your Guide to Citizen Journalism, PBS (Sept. 27, 2006),
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2006/09/your-guide-to-citizen-journalism270.html ("The
idea behind citizen journalism is that people without professional journalism training can
use the tools of modern technology and the global distribution of the Internet to create,
augment or fact-check media on their own or in collaboration with others. . . . Because of
the wide dispersion of so many excellent tools for capturing live events-from tiny digital
cameras to videophones-the average citizen can now make news and distribute it globally,
an act that was once the province of established journalists and media companies.").
121. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
122. See, e.g., Scott Kirsner, On the Web, Audience Size Matters, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, May 27, 2007.
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their grievances elsewhere.12 3
It is now, with the media evolution well under way and the continuing
trend of more widely accessible online services shifting toward the center
of the media stage, that this test does need elaboration. The aim in Gertz
was to establish parameters as to who would be held to the higher standards
invoked by requiring the New York Times actual malice test-and
necessarily, to limit that group to those actually worthy of the protection,
which that test affords. The Court imagined a plaintiff capable of
redressing harms that may have resulted from defamatory statements in the
media, and that a line would be drawn around those people capable of such
access. Those on the other side of the line-private figures unable to access
the audience privy to defamatory statements about them-would not be
required to meet the heightened standard set forth by the Court.
The scenario may have been quite straightforward to the Court:
perhaps it imagined the likes of Johnny Carson facing defamatory
statements in the media (that is, in a newspaper or magazine, on the radio,
or on television). In order to rebut what was said against him, he would
have the capability of accessing a large audience by making a public
statement, issuing a press release, holding a press conference, or otherwise
addressing the allegations. (He could have, of course, also attempted a
defamation claim in court, but would naturally have been required to prove
actual malice.) The initial allegation and the subsequent response given by
Carson would have drawn similar audiences and similar attention. It was
because of this attention that the Court appropriately included this element
in its public figure test; the litigation brought by those who have been
defamed may only be a secondary concern if they are able to counteract the
statement outside of court, and in doing so, to curb the statement's damage.
The Gertz Court's position, with such potential scenarios in mind,
should now be recognized as one that aimed at encouraging public debate
and the introduction of new ideas into the marketplace of ideas-and one
that was extremely reluctant to chill any sort of speech that might result
from self-censorship. The Court's goal was to protect those private
individuals who did not have the means to adequately redress the
defamatory words leveled against them because they did not have access to
an audience that would effectively serve as a forum for rebuttal. In
imagining this person, the Court had in mind someone who could not
immediately turn to the same or similarly situated media outlets to address
what had been said about him or her.
The test imagined by the Court in Gertz-and later in Hutchinson-
would seem to construe the access to media element of the test by using a
123. Walker, supra note 9, at 975.
530 [Vol. 63
HeinOnline  -- 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 530 2010-2011
REVISITING GERTZ
relatively narrow definition of access to media: not one that encompasses
any and all opportunities to be heard by all varieties of audiences, but
rather the opportunity to defend oneself to the audience (or a similar such
audience) that initially received the damaging information. It is this same
reasoning that should guide courts to a new conclusion as to what access to
media means; in this age, there is little guarantee that a posting on a blog or
social networking site will reach a similarly situated audience' 24 that had
exposure to the initial defamatory statement. Thus, a court that factors into
its analysis the mere existence of a plaintiffs blog or the sheer number of
Facebook friends who have access to statements made by the plaintiff
online will not be carrying on the intent of the Gertz Court.
This is not to say that the audience sizes or compositions must be
identical; instead, the point is that the defamed individual should have the
opportunity to respond "effectively" 25 to statements made against him. In
order to consider a response effective, 2 6 it must have some impact on the
audience of or the effect of the initial defamation. This will simply not be
true of a majority of online outlets, considering both the many-to-many
mode of communicationl27 and the very existence of such a vast number of
sources of information available to the average Internet user. With fewer
eyes on any particular online source, the defamation plaintiff is not in a
position to effectively respond to allegedly defamatory statements by
making a posting on just any site online.
It is the courts' responsibility to ensure that the correct lines are
drawn between public and private plaintiffs in defamation cases. One of the
tools that courts can use is the access to media test-but only if it is
appropriately tailored to this era of communication. That means not simply
accepting that any and all media outlets and networking sites are sufficient
124. Because of the international nature of the Internet, this could mean an audience
similarly situated geographically, but it could also mean an audience of roughly equivalent
size and composition that had (or could have had) initial exposure to the defamatory
content. This Author tends to take the latter view when discussing "similarly situated." The
same is true when the Author uses the description of "the same or substantially similar" with
regard to the audience.
125. See Carr v. Forbes, Inc., 259 F.3d 273, 282 n.2 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that "a court
does not ask whether a defamation plaintiff has ever had access to a media outlet with the
same size readership of the allegedly defamatory publication; such an inquiry would
effectively prohibit widely read publications from ever commenting on local controversies.
Our inquiry is rather whether the evidence demonstrates that the defamation plaintiff had
access to channels of effective communication to respond to the allegedly defamatory
statements.").
126. Effective is defined as "producing a decided, decisive, or desired effect." THE
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 397 (11th ed. 2004).
127. Perzanowski, supra note 84, at 834 n.9 ("Many-to-many communications media
allow users to both contribute and receive information. Blogs, file sharing, and Wikis are
among the current many-to-many applications.").
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to show that effective channels of communication exist, but rather that the
plaintiff have access to media such that he can effectively respond to the
statements made against him in such a way as to have a public impact.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this era of mass communication possible with the click of a mouse
(or the tap of a button, or screen, on a cell phone), courts cannot shy away
from the difficult task of clarifying how the Internet interacts with the law.
Defamation cases are certain to encounter these issues sooner rather than
later, and when that happens courts will have choices to make. Are they to
ignore the dozens of ways every individual can access the media? Are they
to find that access sufficient to call anyone with a Facebook account a
public figure? Or are they to appropriately consider the widespread use of
networking online as an everyday activity of private individuals, placing
the correct emphasis on how that individual became a part of the
controversy at hand?
The courts should begin by considering the role of the individual
within the controversy and how it is that he wound up in such a role (that
is, whether she "thrust" herself or was "drawn" into the controversy1 28), and
then to look at the nature of any access to media the plaintiff might have.
By putting into place clear guidance that lower courts can use with
consistency, "commentators will know in advance whether their statements
will be protected."l 2 9 This is to say, by understanding the role of access to
media to be a lesser factor in the test as compared to the individual's
participation in the controversy, the likelihood of confusion over what
satisfies the test will be decreased. But at the same time, an understanding
of what access to media means will ensure that courts are not tripping
themselves up or merely paying lip service to the test. Rather than blindly
accepting that any individual with the capability to blog may sufficiently
find recourse through the Internet, courts should carefully and closely
examine what the make-up of the audience was and how access to a
sizeable and geographically similar audience may have tempered and
served to mitigate the defamation. By analyzing this component of the
plaintiffs status, the court will be giving the appropriate measure of
importance to the ability of the individual to redress the harms done against
him through the publication of potentially defaming statements.
In order to do so with accuracy and precision, courts must face the
fact that the individuals that come before them alleging defamation are
likely to be Internet users. It is a simple fact of today's culture that it is
difficult to find a person not at least somewhat versed in the ways of the
128. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
129. Walker, supra note 9, at 977.
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Internet.13 0 As such, courts should approach individuals who are well
connected and established on social networking sites by properly balancing
the prongs of the limited-purpose public figure test. After the court has
established what exactly the individual's role in the controversy is, and
how that person found herself in that role-that is, whether it was through a
voluntary thrust or through involuntarily being drawn into the
controversy-the court must then weigh the results of this consideration
against the access to media that the individual does or does not have. The
court should do so by beginning with considering the media context in
which the allegedly defamatory material appeared. The court must consider
that this individual's connections on Facebook or Twitter, or followers on
her blog, will not be dispositive-and this is particularly true if the
defamation took place in the traditional context of mainstream media. Was
this a national radio or television broadcast, or a newspaper or magazine
article published in a publication with widespread readership? It must then
assess whether this person has garnered media coverage of their social
networking; or whether the social networking they engage in is merely the
private practice of a private individual wishing to stay current and
connected with her friends. If it is in fact the latter, the court cannot
mistake connections online for the greater requirements of media access-
and it certainly cannot do so if the context in which the initial defamation
appeared was such that the Internet connections the individual is able to
make will do little by way of effectively responding to the much more
widely publicized allegations.
In order to reach such conclusions, it is necessary for courts to
embrace the current era of social networking. As time progresses,
generations will continue to start their Facebook accounts at a younger age
and become more savvy with Twitter, not to mention take advantage of
sites and tools not yet in existence. As such, it is up to courts to track these
changes with tailored decisions, reflecting the truth that individuals are
only going to continue to be more connected online, without necessarily
being any less in need of the protections imagined by Gertz as necessary
for private individuals not equipped to successfully respond to defamation
on their own.
With such calculated balancing and refined definitions to match the
current Internet landscape, courts can successfully maintain the protections
that the Supreme Court set forth for private individuals in order to
130. While the Author's eighty-two-year-old grandfather and noncomputer user would
be an obvious exception to that generalization, a seventy-three-year-old great uncle of the
Author recently recounted the telecommuting he does to continue his consulting work well
into retirement.
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safeguard that individual's own good name, notwithstanding a plaintiffs
large pool of Facebook friends.
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